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OPINION

COWEN, Circuit Judge.
The United States appeals the District Court’s order granting the individual
defendants’ motion seeking a release of $1.5 million of United Corporation’s restrained
assets to pay the individual defendants’ attorneys’ fees. For the reasons given below, we
will vacate the order and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.
3

Because we write only for the benefit of the parties, we recite only those facts
necessary to our analysis. On September 18, 2003, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment charging defendants United Corporation, Fathi Yusuf, Waleed Hamed,
Waheed Hamed, Maher Yusuf, and Isam Yousof with various offenses, including
conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The indictment also
alleged criminal forfeiture of certain property of the defendants, under 18 U.S.C. § 982
and 21 U.S.C. § 853.
On the same date, the government filed two ex parte motions for temporary
restraining orders under 21 U.S.C. § 853 and 14 U.S.C. § 606, respectively, to preserve
the availability of assets which, in the event of conviction, would be subject to forfeiture.
The District Court granted the motions and entered the Temporary Retraining Orders.
In December 2003, defendants Fathi Yusuf, Maher Yusuf, and Nejeh Yusuf,1 and
non-defendant shareholders Fawzia Yusuf and Yusuf Yusuf, filed a motion requesting a
modification of the Temporary Restraining Orders and a release of funds in order to pay
their legal defense. Before the District Court reached a decision on the motion, the
government, the defendants, and the non-defendant shareholders entered into an Agreed
Amendment to Restraining Order (“Agreed Amendment”).
The Agreed Amendment authorized United Corporation to “use corporate funds in
an amount up to $2.5 million for the exclusive purpose of paying reasonable fees to

1

The grand jury returned a superseding indictment that added Nejeh Yusuf as a
defendant in various counts.
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counsel of record and agents of counsel of record, including experts, investigators, [and]
accountants, in connection with the legal defense of defendants United, Fathi Yusuf,
Maher F. Yusuf, Nejeh F. Yusuf, Waleed M. Hamed, and Waheed M. Hamed in the
above-styled criminal action pending in the District of the Virgin Islands.” (Agreed
Amendment ¶ 3.) The Agreed Amendment further provided that “[t]he defendants listed
in this paragraph may request additional funds upon motion to the Court; the government
reserves the right to oppose any such request.” (Id.) (emphasis added).
On January 13, 2005, the individual defendants filed a motion seeking a release of
an additional $1.5 million for trial preparation and litigation expenses, including
attorneys’ fees and expert fees. The government opposed the motion, arguing that
defendants had not demonstrated that they had no alternate sources of funds available.
In a Report and Recommendation, a United States Magistrate Judge recommended
to the District Court that the individual defendants’ motion be granted. The magistrate
judge reasoned that the funds authorized under the Agreed Amendment had been spent
appropriately and were virtually depleted. In addition, the magistrate judge noted that a
release of an additional $1.5 million would not significantly deplete United Corporation’s
cash flow and retained earnings.
Following a hearing, the District Court entered an order on April 25, 2005,
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and granting the defendants’ January 13,
2005 motion for a release of $1.5 million in funds. “[A]lthough the Agreed Amendment
specifically provide[d] that the Government may oppose a request for additional funds,
5

the [District] Court construe[d] the Agreed Amendment as permitting the Government to
oppose such a request only upon grounds that it did not raise previous to entering into the
Agreed Amendment.” (Memorandum Opinion at 5.) Because the government had
previously raised the issue of the defendants’ alleged failure to demonstrate a lack of
other sources of funds to pay their legal fees, the District Court concluded that the
government had now waived that issue. In addition, the District Court agreed with the
magistrate judge that the funds advanced under the Agreed Amendment had been spent
appropriately and were virtually depleted.
The government now appeals the District Court’s order permitting a release of
$1.5 million in funds subject to the Temporary Restraining Orders.
II.
We have interlocutory jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1292. We
review a district court’s construction of a stipulation de novo. Coltec Indus., Inc. v.
Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002). We review a district court’s interpretation of
a stipulation, as well as its underlying factual findings, under a clearly erroneous standard.
Id.; USX Corp. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 130 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 1997).
III.
The government contends that the District Court erred in concluding that the
government had waived its right to oppose the individual defendants’ motion for a release
of $1.5 million in restrained assets. The District Court based its waiver determination on
its construction of the language in the Agreed Amendment. Because we conclude that the
6

plain and unambiguous language of the Agreed Amendment is not susceptible to the
meaning adopted by the District Court, we agree with the government that there was no
waiver.
We have stated that “[a] consensual stipulation of the parties is to be interpreted
according to the general principles of contract construction.” USX Corp., 130 F.3d at 566
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, because the government is
a party to the agreement, we apply the federal common law of contract. See Boyle v.
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (“[The Supreme Court] ha[s] held that
obligations to and rights of the United States under its contracts are governed exclusively
by federal law.”); see also Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947)
(“It is customary, where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to apply to the
construction of government contracts the principles of general contract law.”).2
Under the federal common law of contract, we apply the following steps to
identify the existence, if any, of a contractual ambiguity:
To decide whether a contract is ambiguous, we do not simply determine
whether, from our point of view, the language is clear. Rather, we “hear the
proffer of the parties and determine if there [are] objective indicia that, from
the linguistic reference point of the parties, the terms of the contract are
susceptible of different meanings.” Sheet Metal Workers [v. 2300 Group,
Inc.], 949 F.2d [1274] at 1284 [3d Cir. 1991] (brackets in original)
(quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001,
1011 (3d Cir. 1980)). Before making a finding concerning the existence or

2

Although neither the government nor the defendants has expressly addressed the
issue of what law governs the construction of the Agreed Amendment, the parties
uniformly cite to federal case law in their briefs.
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absence of ambiguity, we consider the contract language, the meanings
suggested by counsel, and the extrinsic evidence offered in support of each
interpretation. Id.; [International Union v.] Mack Trucks, 917 F.2d [107] at
111 [3d Cir. 1990]; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 223 cmt.
b (1981) (“There is no requirement that an agreement be ambiguous before
evidence of a course of dealing can be shownAAAA”). Extrinsic evidence may
include the structure of the contract, the bargaining history, and the conduct
of the parties that reflects their understanding of the contract's meaning.
Teamsters Indus. Employees Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc.,
989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993).
In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 150 (3d Cir. 1996). As one of our sister courts has
stated, “[i]f a contract is not open to any other reasonable interpretations, and is therefore
unambiguous, then the written words of the contract must dictate the disposition of a
dispute involving that contract.” Funeral Fin. Sys. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1015, 1018
(7th Cir. 2000) (applying federal common law of contract).
In this case, the District Court determined that the Agreed Amendment was
susceptible to an interpretation that limited the government’s right to oppose a release of
additional restrained funds. In the District Court’s view, the parties entered into the
Agreed Amendment to forego a judicial determination on the issues they had raised
before entering into the agreement. Because the government had previously raised the
issue of the defendants’ alleged failure to demonstrate a lack of other sources of funds to
pay their legal fees, the District Court concluded that the government could not reassert
the issue. Thus, “the [District] Court construe[d] the Agreed Amendment as permitting
the Government to oppose [] a request [for additional funds] only upon grounds that it did
not raise previous to entering into the Agreed Amendment.” (Memorandum Opinion at
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5.)
After reviewing the language of the Agreed Amendment, we cannot agree with the
District Court’s construction of the contract. The Agreed Amendment plainly states that
“the government reserves the right to oppose any such request [for additional funds].”
(Agreed Amendment ¶ 3.) The government’s right is expressed in broad, unqualified
terms. There is no language in this provision, or any other part of the parties’ agreement,
that could reasonably be construed to limit the grounds upon which the government might
oppose a defense request for additional funds. For example, this provision does not suffer
from a lack of definiteness or contain vague or obscure words subject to a double
meaning. See Landtect Corp. v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 605 F.2d 75, 80
(3d Cir. 1979) (“An ambiguous contract is one capable of being understood in more
senses than one; an agreement obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression,
or having a double meaning . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Rather, the provision is reasonably understood as having only one meaning, namely, that
the government has an unqualified right to oppose a defense request for a release of
restrained funds. Thus, we conclude that the language in the Agreed Amendment is not
reasonably susceptible to the restrictive meaning adopted by the District Court.
To be clear, we do not intimate that the District Court erred in merely considering
the parties’ negotiations in construing the terms of the parties’ agreement. In determining
whether a contract is ambiguous, a district court may consider extrinsic evidence in
support of a party’s proposed interpretation. See In re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d at 150.
9

However, a district court cannot rest its ambiguity finding on extrinsic evidence alone.
The district court must consider the extrinsic evidence in conjunction with the contract
language itself. Here, the extrinsic evidence offered by the individual defendants does
not show “from the linguistic reference point of the parties, [that] the terms of the contract
are susceptible of different meanings.” Sheet Metal Workers, 949 F.2d at 1284 (quoting
Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011).
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the government did not waive any
aspect of its right to object to defendants’ motion for additional funds. Accordingly, we
will vacate the District Court’s order dated April 25, 2005, and remand this case to the
District Court to consider defendants’ motion on the merits.3
On remand, the District Court should consider whether a due process hearing is
required in accordance with the framework set forth in United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d
641, 647 (10th Cir. 1998).4 Under that framework, a due process hearing is required if
the defendant: (1) “demonstrate[s] to the court’s satisfaction that she has no assets, other
than those restrained,” and (2) “make[s] a prima facie showing of a bona fide reason to
3

We remind the District Court that “[a]lthough the Sixth Amendment grants a
defendant the right to obtain counsel of his choice, this right ‘does not extend beyond the
individual’s right to spend his own legitimate, nonforfeitable assets.’” United States v.
Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d
800, 802 (4th Cir. 2001)).
4

In their briefs, both the individual defendants and the government cite, with approval,
to all or part of the Jones framework. We believe that the framework outlined in Jones
achieves a proper balance between the private interests of the defendants in their Sixth
Amendment right of counsel and the government’s interest in preserving forfeitable
assets. See 160 F.3d at 645-47.
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believe the grand jury erred in determining that the restrained assets constitute or are
derived, directly or indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the
offense.” Id. (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted); accord United
States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 803 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[D]ue process requires a pretrial
adversary hearing when a defendant claims that a portion of the assets restrained pursuant
to criminal forfeiture statutes are untainted and that he has no other funds from which to
secure the counsel of his choice.”).
If the individual defendants satisfy these initial burdens, the District Court should
then conduct an adversarial hearing at which “the government must establish probable
cause to believe that the restrained assets are traceable to the underlying offense.” Jones,
160 F.3d at 647.5 The post-restraint inquiry at the adversarial hearing is limited to the
traceability of the restrained assets, and, thus, the government need not reestablish
probable cause to believe that defendants are guilty of the underlying offense. Id. at 648.
At the hearing, the District Court may receive and consider evidence and information that
would otherwise be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 647-48. If the
government establishes probable cause concerning the traceability of the assets, the
District Court must deny the individual defendants’ motion. If the government cannot

5

We reject the government’s suggestion that the grand jury’s determination of
probable cause is alone sufficient to show that funds subject to restraint are traceable to
the offenses charged. As noted in Jones, a grand jury investigation is non-adversarial in
nature and thus does not afford the procedural protections required of due process. 160
F.3d at 645-46.
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establish probable cause, the individual defendants are entitled to a release of funds for
the payment of their legal defense.
We will vacate the District Court’s order dated April 25, 2005, and remand this
case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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